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Abstract 
In this paper I develop the point that whereas talent is the basis for desert, talent itself is not 
meritocratically deserved. It is produced by three processes, none of which are meritocratic: 
(1) talent is unequally distributed by the rigged lottery of birth, (2) talent is defined in ways 
that favor some traits over others, and (3) the market for talent is manipulated to maximally 
extract advantages by those who have more of it. To see how, we require a sociological 
perspective on economic rent. I argue that talent is a major means through which people seek 
rent in modern-day capitalism. Talent today is what inherited land was to feudal societies; an 
unchallenged source of symbolic and economic rewards. Whereas God sanctified the 
aristocracy’s wealth, contemporary privilege is legitimated by meritocracy. Drawing on the 
work of Gary Becker, Pierre Bourdieu and Jerome Karabel, I show how rent-seeking in 
modern societies has come to rely principally on rent definition and creation. Inequality is 
produced by the ways in which talent is defined, institutionalization, and sustained by the 
moral deservingness we attribute to the accomplishments of talents. Consequently, today’s 
inequalities are as striking as ever, yet harder to challenge than ever before. 






Capital makes the world go ‘round. Those who own it reap the rewards. Many of the 
largest companies in the world are in car manufacturing (Toyota, Volkswagen), petroleum 
refining (Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell), and other industries that rely on copious amounts 
of capital. Social science research describes how ownership of capital is a major source of 
wealth inequality (Keister and Moller 2000; Killewald, Pfeffer, and Schachner 2017; Piketty 
2014). Scholarship points to the unfair advantages capital ownership provides, such as the 
ability to extract rent beyond its productive value (Atkinson 2015; Sørensen 2000, 1996; 
Weeden and Grusky 2014). Moreover, capital is passed down intergenerationally to sons and 
daughters whose only accomplishment is being born to the right set of parents. Some of the 
wealthiest people in the world today owe their fortune to their family business. From the 
Waltons (Wal-mart) and Bettencourts (L’Oreal), to the Mars family and the Koch brothers, 
today’s rich belong to the same social groups, networks, and families as those who held the 
reins generations ago (Chetty et al. 2014; Pfeffer and Killewald 2018).  
While scholars, journalists and politicians are scrutinizing the ownership, 
transmission, and use of capital, much of modern-day inequality has a different guise. 
Whereas we disapprove of the plutocracy of capital, we celebrate the meritocracy of talent 
(Littler 2018; Mijs 2019; Mulligan 2018b). The last decades have seen the rise of companies 
based on little more than great ideas, and a top one percent of athletes, pop stars, managers 
and executive officers, whose fortunes derive from their unique set of skills and abilities. 
Today, six out of the ten largest equities in the Standard & Poor 500 are IT companies built 
on the creativity, entrepreneurship, and hard work of extraordinary individuals. We speak of 
talent when an athlete outperforms the competition, when a young politician rises through the 
ranks of their party, or when two guys in a garage1 set up what turns out to be one of the 
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largest companies in the world. We laud talent, we love those who have it, and we loathe our 
own limits; if only we had come up with that idea first, we’d be the Bill, Larry, Sheryl or 
Oprah with a billion dollars to our name. 
There is a shadow side to the meritocracy of talent. In the world of talent, success is 
driven by good ideas, ambition, and hard work. Inequality simply reflects their uneven 
distribution: some of us are brighter, aim higher, work harder. It is a compelling story, but 
one with cruel consequences. When talent is the basis for success, and differences in talent 
are the source of economic fortune, what right do we have to complain about inequality and 
its excesses? Looking at society through the lens of talent equates success with merit, failure 
with incompetence. Talent consecrates people’s privileged place in society (Accominotti 
2018; Khan 2010). Talent today is what inherited land was to feudal societies; an 
unchallenged source of symbolic and economic rewards. Whereas God sanctified the 
aristocracy’s wealth, contemporary privilege is legitimated by talent. Consequently, today’s 
inequalities are as striking as ever, yet harder to challenge than ever before.  
In this paper, I argue that talent and capital have much more in common than meets 
the eye. I will show that the economic gains of talent rely on a process of rent-seeking 
previously reserved for the owners of capital. In what follows, I give a brief history of rent to 
show how the return on talent relies on three processes, none of which are meritocratic: (1) 
just like capital, talents are intergenerationally transmitted from parents to children; (2) 
further, what constitutes talent relies on the definitional power of powerful gatekeepers who 
decide which traits to reward and which to discard; (3) moreover, talents are structural, not 
individual traits; their economic returns are institutionalized in privileged positions. In sum, I 
will show that inequality is produced by the ways in which talent is defined, transmitted, and 




A short history of rent 
 
The word rent, to most people, is a reminder of their monthly commitment to a 
landlord or landlady; the price that comes with the roof over their head. For others, it is a 
source of income: property owners extract rent by letting real estate to people or businesses 
willing to pay more than their upkeep requires. We tend to associate the term real estate with 
houses, and the agents selling them, but it actually refers to buildings as well as land. 
Whereas it is ownership of the former that is especially important in today’s urban societies, 
for most of human history land has been the primary source of income and wealth.  
Economic theory describes how, starting with David Ricardo’s law of rent. Ricardo 
(1817) defines rent as the individual benefits accrued by owning land, over and above its 
productive quality. Land, if used for agricultural purposes, for instance, has a productive 
quality. Ownership of the land however has its own benefit: the ability to extract additional 
returns in the form of rent. Such benefits derive from artificial limits to the supply of an asset, 
like in a monopoly (see Marshall 1895). Given a fixed supply of land, the owners can extract 
returns that greatly exceed its value in a competitive market.  
Whereas Ricardo’s law of rent continues to inform economic thought, the industrial 
revolution and the coming of post-industrial society (Bell 1973) meant the concept of rent 
required an update. Jacob Mincer (1958), Theodore Schultz (1960), and, most notably, Gary 
Becker (1962) provide the foundation for that by taking the concept of capital to the labor 
market and to the realm of education. Human capital theory states that our minds and bodies 
are potential sources of rent as well. To Becker, human capital is how most modern citizens 
make a living; the market rewards people’s investments in productive skills, knowledge, 




“Schooling, a computer training course, expenditures of medical care, and lectures on 
the virtues of punctuality and honesty [are] capital. That is because they raise 
earnings, improve health, or add to a person's good habits over much of his lifetime. 
Therefore, economists regard expenditures on education, training, medical care, and 
so on as investments in human capital. They are called human capital because people 
cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or values in the way they can 
be separated from their financial and physical assets.” (Becker 2002) 
 
Whereas the focus of human capital theory is on the productive quality of education 
and health, minds and bodies can also be a source of rent. For one, the supply of human 
capital is artificially limited. As Becker and others have acknowledged, people are not 
equally positioned to reap the rewards of investments in human capital. Potential investments 
in human capital are limited by financial constraints, which are a function of the cost of 
schooling (and the cost of health, among other productive qualities) and opportunities to 
invest; i.e. the availability of and access to pre-schools, private tutoring and extra-curricular 
activities, elite colleges, etc. Simply put, you can’t accumulate human capital if you cannot 
afford school or get in.  
The human capital equation however is missing a crucial variable, to which I now 
turn. Rent-seeking in the age of human capital rests on talent. 
 
Returns = investment * talent 
 
No amount of schooling will turn a half-wit into a genius. Equally, Einstein may have 
written his theory of relativity even if he hadn’t graduated from high school (which, some 
sources suggest, he barely did).2 In other words, some talent is required for schooling to make 
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an impact. In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that a higher level of available talent is 
likely to produce greater returns on the invested education.  
To start, schools are set up to cater specifically to students’ talents, either by adjusting 
the level and pace of learning to students’ abilities or by differentiating instruction altogether 
by sorting students into general and honor’s classes, vocational and academic tracks, and 
other forms of grouping based on ability (Domina, Penner, and Penner 2017; Mijs 2011; Van 
de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010). Moreover, a student’s talents determine whether particular 
educational opportunities are or aren’t available. For instance, remedial classes are offered 
only to students with learning difficulties, while a great deal of talent is required for a person 
to be given the opportunity of receiving an Ivy League education as elite institutions 
purposefully keep enrollment low (more on this point below). 
In short, real returns on education equal investment times talent. Minds and bodies 
become a source of rent when ideas and skills are deemed unique talents which merit a 
reward beyond their productive qualities. In what follows, I show that there is nothing 
necessary or natural about talent’s economic returns. Just like other forms of capital, talents 
(1) are intergenerationally transferred; (2) rely on being so defined by powerful gatekeepers; 
and (3) are institutionalized in positions of privilege and protected professions. 
 
1. We receive our talents from our parents 
Reflective of the classical Greek meaning of the word τάλαντον (money), we receive 
our talents from our parents. Academic ability, IQ, health, height, and physical attractiveness 
are just a few of the many traits unequally distributed by the rigged lottery of birth (Fischer et 
al. 1996; Rimfeld et al. 2018). On top of the genetic gains of birth are a set of social skills—
or “cultural capital” to use Bourdieu’s (1984) term. Children acquire from their parents and 
from their social milieu more generally, traits and manners, a sense of entitlement or 
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constraint, and a level of (dis)comfort with adults and authorities, which makes school a 
much more productive space for some than for others. Upper (middle) class parents tend to 
instill in their children the cultural capital to set them up well for tests and exams (Bourdieu 
1984; Yamamoto and Brinton 2010), dream big and aim high (Jackson 2013; Lareau 2011), 
and assure that teachers give them the attention they demand (Calarco 2011, 2018). 
In Bourdieu’s words, by failing to take into account the investments already made 
within the family, 
 
[Human capital theorists] let slip the best hidden and socially most determinant 
educational investment, namely, the domestic transmission of cultural capital. Their 
studies of the relationship between academic ability and academic investment show 
that they are unaware that ability or talent is itself the product of an investment of 
time and cultural capital. (Bourdieu 1986:244–45) 
 
In other words, talent is inherited, in the strict sense, to the extent that our intellectual 
ability, health, and other productive traits are based on the genetic makeup we receive from 
our parents. In a broader sense as well, children’s talents depend on their parents (Smeeding, 
Erikson, and Jäntti 2011). Children rarely make investment decisions themselves; the amount 
of time, attention and resources parents commit to education (“shadow education”) greatly 
impacts their children’s human capital accumulation (Buchmann, Condron, and Roscigno 
2010). Taken together, there are vast and consequential differences in people’s opportunity to 
benefit from human capital and extract rent, because of the unequal distribution of talent and 
early investments therein. Talents, in short are far from the individual quality we make them 




2. Talent is whatever is so defined 
When Ivy League colleges invented American Football around 1880, a new set of 
talents was created with it. Some such talents travel better than others; being a good football 
(soccer) player may earn you respect and, if you’re good enough, a living, in as many as 200 
countries with professional football leagues. Being good in American Football, by contrast, 
means much more in one country than anywhere else.  
 The portability of talent points to a crucial quality: talent’s meaning and payoff is 
context-specific, varying across place and over time.3 What is true for American Football is 
true for musical craft and artistic talent; and even for the traits that people value in others. As 
I have argued elsewhere (Mijs 2016:20), what constitutes merit is historically contingent and 
institutionally-specific: 
 
Manliness, aggression, asceticism and (bi)sexuality, for instance, were considered 
important traits for men to have in Sparta, 400 B.C., and display of such traits was 
rewarded with social status (De Botton 2005). In Western Europe anno 479, in 
contrast, pacifism, vegetarianism and asexuality were considered meritocratic traits 
(ibid.). Similarly changes in meritocratic traits over time are described with regard to 
the rise of court society (Elias 1939), in the evaluation of American social science and 
humanities scholarship (Tsay et al. 2003), as well as between men and women today 
(Prentice and Carranza 2002). 
 
What is termed, considered and concomitantly rewarded as productive traits, skills 
and knowledge depends on how such are defined by society’s gatekeepers. So does the 
opportunity to earn rent with your talent.  
A powerful empirical illustration of this insight comes from Karabel’s (2005) archival 
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research at Harvard, Princeton and Yale. Digging through their archives, he uncovered 
detailed minutes and reports describing how in the post-World War II era these elite 
institutions discussed and devised strategies for keeping out unwanted groups of students, 
while keeping their gates open to the students they wanted to have. How? By defining merit 
in ways that their preferred students could meet, but others couldn’t. First they included 
‘character’ in the admission criteria as a way to exclude Catholics, then they introduced 
additional requirements in the form of recommendation letters and personal interviews as a 
means to weed out the uninitiated. As a means of last resort, they incorporated athleticism 
into their definition of merit to raise the barrier for purportedly physically-unfit Jewish 
students.  
The take-away from Karabel’s study is that definitions of talent are never neutral; 
how we define qualities like talent, character and merit always benefits some groups of 
people, while putting others at a disadvantage. Consequently, an important basis of rent-
seeking lies with those who are in a position to define talent. The definition of talent does not 
stop at the frontgate; schools continuously draw boundaries between groups of students (e.g. 
“vocational,” “academic,” “gifted,” “at-risk”) (Golann 2015). For those fortunate to fit the 
mold, these boundaries can produce powerful credentials (degrees) and distinctions (e.g. 
“magna cum laude”). In the worst-case-scenario, they lead to a student’s expulsion, the long-
term consequences of which have been described as a “school-to-prison pipeline” (Kim, 
Losen, and Hewitt 2010; Mittleman 2018; Welch and Payne 2018). 
This definitional power extends far beyond the realm of education, into the world of 
literature (Franssen and Kuipers 2013), fashion (Mears 2010), business (Khurana 2002), and 





3. Talents are institutionalized in positions of privilege  
Some definitions of talent fluctuate; others are more stable. The main process by 
which definitions are made to stick is through institutionalization: the rent-producing quality 
of talent is incorporated in positions that generate rent. Simply put, in order to turn your labor 
power into money, you need a job or a market for your services. Without either, your hard 
work and talent will go unrewarded. 
Sports offer a good illustration of this process. The ability to jump high, dribble and 
throw a bouncing ball was institutionalized in the sport of basketball in 1891. Before that 
time, playing basketball was just that: play. With the institutionalization of the sport, that 
ability became a skill, and with the establishment of the National Basketball Association in 
1946 that skill became a productive quality. As the sport’s popularity grew, its valuation rose. 
Today, a professional basketball player in America can make as much as $45 million in a 
season, not taking into account the lucrative sponsorship deals that supplement athletes’ 
salaries.  
That dollar figure is the result of a very long process of rent-creation. In fact, that 
process is still ongoing. Every number of years, players and teams come together to negotiate 
just how much their talents are worth. Players today make a lot more than what they made a 
few decades ago, and players in the US make a multitude of what players in other countries 
make. The difference is the level of institutionalization of the sport and the rent creation that 
came with it. Rent, in sports, is the difference between an athlete with and one without a job. 
Whereas the difference in skills, effort and talent may be minimal, the difference in reward is 
likely to be enormous. Owing to “superstar” markets (Rosen 1981), a very small group of 
athletes (Lewis and Yoon 2018), college graduates (Clotfelter 2017), fashion models (Mears 
2011), and rock stars (Krueger 2005) takes home a disproportional part of the pie. As 




In more mundane spheres of life as well, people benefit from institutionalized 
positions of privilege. Certain professions for instance are protected by what Freidson (1970, 
2001) calls ‘labor market sheltering’: strategies for limiting entry into certain professional 
groups, such as bar exams for lawyers and board exams for doctors. Such practices allow for 
professional groups to extract advantages beyond the market value of their human capital. 
Besides deciding who gains entry into these professions, through such entry requirements, 
occupational societies set limits to the number of people allowed into their profession, 
thereby putting a cap on the supply-side of the equation that sets their wages.  
Another way occupational groups establish rent-seeking is by institutionalizing 
demand for their services through government licensing and other forms of occupational 
closure (Sørensen 1996). When you go to court, you would do well to get an attorney. In fact, 
in most countries, you will be provided with one, if needed, on the government’s dime. Less 
obvious is the need, institutionalized in many countries around the world, for a (notary) 
lawyer when purchasing a house, accepting an inheritance, merging two businesses, 
translating a government document, or transferring an Internet domain. All these 
monopolistic services derive from government regulation successfully fought for by 
occupational groups and societies (see Abbott 1988). 
Yet another source of rent-seeking is in hiring and pay-setting institutions that do not 
operate on market principles. CEO wages are set by a board of directors who have an interest 
in appeasing the person whose salary they control (Bebchuk and Fried 2009; Weeden and 
Grusky 2014). When a board of directors hires a CEO, they may in earnest be picking the 
most meritorious candidate. They are unlikely however to have a lot to choose from. The 
pool of candidates is limited by a long list of structural forces that keep people from rising 





Closure generates an artificial scarcity of candidates who are considered for the CEO 
job. The function of closure is not only to limit the competitive field in this way but 
also to set the terms of competition and to assign the rewards for work done in 
accordance with these limits. It creates the rules of the game, constituting the 
boundaries by which people will be judged and criticized. At its core, then, the 
external CEO labor “market” operates as a circulation of elites within a single, sealed-
off system relying on socially legitimated criteria that—contrary to conventional 
economic wisdom—are not to be confused with relevant skills for the CEO position. 
(Khurana 2002:205) 
 
In sum, many of the accomplishments celebrated as individual feats in fact reflect the 
privileged positions people occupy. Such positions depend on a long process of 
institutionalization through which occupational groups such as lawyers, doctors and 
basketball players, have established rent-seeking privileges. In short, it’s not people and their 




A growing elite in modern societies has made its wealth not based on their birthright, 
inherited fortune, or by manifest market manipulations. Today’s elite is a meritocracy of 
great ideas and entrepreneurship, and the special talents of artists, athletes and managerial 
miracle workers. Or so the story goes.  
 In this paper I have argued that talent in fact relies on structural advantages that have 
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nothing to do with the market nor with merit. The accomplishments of talent rely first on the 
intergenerational transmission of genetic and cultural endowments from parents to their 
children. Parents, moreover, provide the cultural competence and economic resources to 
cultivate their children’s productive traits—or lack the means to. In short, both the 
distribution of and investment in talent depend on the lottery of birth. 
The returns on talents further depend on which talents are recognized and rewarded. 
As illustrated by the history of sports, an American Football player before 1880 was just a 
guy running around with an egg-shaped ball and a harness on. Today, he can make millions 
of dollars, given that he’s privileged to be playing for an NFL team. Talents, in other words, 
are institutionally-specific and historically contingent. Much power resides with the persons 
and institutions that guard the gates of talent. 
The opportunity to earn rent from your talent rests on institutional forces. For a person 
to make an income based on their work, they need a job or market to work. Certain types of 
work have a payoff that far exceeds their market-value. The talents of lawyers, managers, 
athletes and artists, have been institutionalized in their respective vocations by processes of 
social closure. Closure artificially limits entry into professions and occupations, increases 
demand for services, and manipulates their pay to maximize the return on talent. In short, it 
may be more accurate to speak of talents and their people, than of people and their talents. 
Whereas a further exploration of the topic falls beyond the scope of this paper, it 
merits mentioning that the undeserved advantages of inheritance, rent-definition, and rent-
creation, discussed in this paper, seamlessly coexist with capitalism—best illustrated perhaps 
by the countless examples of such instances in contemporary America. The neoliberal 
emphasis on market, competition and responsibility has helped elevate talent to what is 
arguably society’s most celebrated trait (Hall and Lamont 2013; Littler 2018). ‘Investing’ in 
talent and preventing its ‘waste’ has become a major policy focus in advanced capitalist 
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societies (OECD 2008; and see Mijs 2016:16–17), and deemed the best hope for international 
development (World Bank 2010). Paradoxically, then, pro-market ideology has come to 
support and celebrate an enemy of the market, economic rent, under the thin veil of talent. 
In conclusion, when we buy and sell the myth that today’s billionaires started with 
nothing but a garage and a great idea, we miss the moral means for scrutinizing inequality. 
Looking at wealth and status as the accomplishments of individual talent, removes the ground 
for public debate and political action. Talent cannot be faulted, nor can it be taxed. 
Recognizing the socially-constructed nature of talent and its institutionalized power, is the 
first and necessary step for an interrogation of the economic and symbolic returns on talents 
in contemporary society.  
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1 “We started our company out of our garage,” serves to convey the notion that all a 
successful enterprise needs is a good idea and a lot of hard work. It has become such a 
common phrase that it is now referred to as the garage trope. It features as the origin myth of 
Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, among other companies 
(https://www.inc.com/drew-hendricks/6-25-billion-companies-that-started-in-a-garage.html). 
 
2 Einstein did not master French, which was a required topic in his Swiss high school. This is 
also the most probable reason he failed to gain admission to the prestigious Federal Technical 
Institute in Zurich. Biographers however note that Einstein showed early signs of his 
brilliance in high school, and point also to the role of his home environment where 
“manipulations of electricity and magnetism were a daily preoccupation helped set him on a 
road that led to his first relativity theory” 
(https://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/14/science/einstein-revealed-as-brilliant-in-youth.html). 
 
3 Another way to express this quality of talent is to think of it, in Bourdieusian terms, as field-
specific capital; i.e. the qualities and traits that pay off in a particular (structural) setting 
(Lamont and Lareau 1988).  
